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INTRODUCTION 
 According to statistics published by the U.S. Department of Justice, at the end of 2010, 
thirty-six states authorized the use of capital punishment and 3,158 inmates had been given the 
death sentence.
1
 Mental Health America, a leading non-profit advocacy group, estimates that 
approximately five to ten percent of prisoners on death row have a serious mental illness such as 
Schizophrenia.
2
 The average amount of time that a death row inmate had spent awaiting his 
eventual execution was 14 years and 10 months.
3
 Furthermore, the living conditions and the poor 
quality of life of death row inmates has been shown to not only cause prisoners psychological 
stress, but to also result in an increase in the number of prisoners who become incompetent after 
they are sentenced.
4
 The Supreme Court established that the execution of a prisoner who is 
insane is unconstitutional because it violates the Eighth Amendment and its ban against cruel and 
unusual punishment.
5
 In order to circumvent the ban on executing an insane prisoner, states have 
turned to the option of forcibly medicating a mentally incompetent prisoner with antipsychotic 
medication to restore the competency of the prisoner for the purpose of execution.
6
  
 However, states are not justified in promulgating forcible medication regimes to restore a 
mentally incompetent prisoners competency for execution, and the recent trend by states to 
mitigate the insanity defense has only worsened this problem. First, I will explain the current 
state of the law that relates to forcible medication regimes both generally, and in the capital 
                                                        
1
 Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2010 – Statistical Tables, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Dec. 20, 2011), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2236.  
2
 Position Statement 54: Death Penalty and People with Mental Illnesses, MENTAL HEALTH AM., 
http://www.nmha.org/go/position-statements/54 (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).                                                 
3
 Snell, supra note 1.  
4
 Rochelle Graff Salguero, Medical Ethics and Competency to be Executed 96 YALE L.J. 167, 171-72 (1986). 
5
 Ford v. Wainwright at 409-10. 
6
 Brent W. Stricker, Seeking an Answer: Questioning the Validity of Forcible Medication to Ensure Mental 
Competency of Those Condemned to Die, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 317, 323 (2000); Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 
1018 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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punishment context. Next, I will present a number of arguments and justifications in support of 
the idea that forcible medication regimes used by states for purposes of execution are unjustified.  
Then, I will present potential procedural solutions, which provide an alternative from the use of 
forcible medication regimes. Finally, the in the last part of this paper I will explain why the states 
recent trend to limit the use of the insanity defense is worsening the problem of forcible 
medication regimes.  
I.  THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
 The current state of the law governing forcible medication regimes is broken down into 
the following three sections. The first section discusses the forcible medication of mentally 
incompetent prisoners generally and is not limited to a capital punishment context. The second 
section discusses the Supreme Court mental health jurisprudence regarding application of the 
death penalty to mentally incompetent prisoners. The final section discusses cases where courts 
in different jurisdictions came to dissimilar conclusions with regards to the specific issue of 
whether a state can forcibly medicate mentally incompetent prisoners in order to restore their 
competency for execution.  
A. Forcible Medication of Mentally Incompetent Prisoners 
In 1976 Walter Harper was arrested and sentenced to prison after committing a robbery, 
and after his conviction he spent a number of years in the prison’s mental health unit where he 
initially consented to antipsychotic medication.
7
 Harper refused to continue taking the 
medication in November of 1982, but the prison’s Special Offender Center had established 
Policy 600.30 under which Harper’s treating physician began to forcibly medicate him while 
disregarding his objections.
8
 Harper filed suit against the State in February 1985 alleging that the 
                                                        
7
 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213-14 (1990).  
8
 Id. at 214. 
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State’s involuntary medication violated the Due Process Clause and the Washington Supreme 
Court eventually concluded that because of the “highly intrusive nature” of treatment with 
antipsychotic medications, the State needed to afford greater procedural protections to not violate 
Harper’s liberty interests.9  
On February 27, 1990, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Washington v. 
Harper that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit the State 
from forcibly medicating a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drugs if (1) he is dangerous to 
himself or others; and (2) the treatment is in his medical interest.
10
 The Supreme Court held that 
because of the dangers of the prison environment, and because Harper himself was posing a 
threat to the other inmates and the staff of the prison, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would allow the forced administration of antipsychotic medication.
11
 However, the 
Supreme Court did recognize that a prisoner such as Harper retained a significant liberty interest 
in avoiding the administration of unwarranted antipsychotic drugs since “[t]he forcible injection 
of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with that 
person’s liberty.”12 
In Sell v. United States, Charles Sell was a practicing dentist who was plagued with a 
long history of mental illness.
13
 In 1998 he was indicted by the grand jury for attempting to 
murder an FBI agent and his fictitious insurance fraud claims were also joined together.
14
 Sell 
was then found to be mentally incompetent to stand trial and the Medical Center statff was trying 
                                                        
9
 Id. at 217-18 
10
 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
11
 Id. at 227. 
12
 Id. at 229 (explaining some of the dangerous side effects resulting from antipsychotic drugs such as acute 
dystonia which is a severe involuntary spasm of the throat, tongue, eyes, and upper body).  
13
 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003). 
14
 Id. at 170 
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to force Sell to take his medication against his will since had refused, leading to the issue in this 
case.”15 
The Supreme Court also upheld the forcible medication of an incompetent prisoner in 
order to restore their competency to stand trial in 2003 in Sell v. United States.
16
 While the Court 
upheld the forcible medication, its holding was narrowed by the standard the Court adopted since 
it would permit the involuntary administration of medication solely for trial competency in 
certain situations.
17
 Pursuant to the Sell standard, for the State to forcibly medicate a prisoner for 
trial competency, (1) the court “must find that important governmental interests” exist; (2) the 
court “must conclude forced medication significantly further those concomitant state interests”; 
(3) the court must conclude that the forced medication is “necessary to further those state 
interests”; and (4) the court “must conclude that the administration of the drugs is medically 
appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition.”18 
The Court held that the under the first prong of the Sell test “[t]he Government’s interest 
in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important.”19 For the second prong 
of the test the Court held, “[i]t must find that administration of the drugs is substantially likely to 
render the defendant competent to stand trial.”20 Under the third prong of this test the Court held 
that it “must find that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve 
substantially the same results.”21 Finally, under the fourth prong of this test the Court held that 
                                                        
15
 Id. at 171.  
16
 Id.   
17
 Id. at 180. 
18
 Id. at 180-82.  
19
 Id. at 180 
20
 Id. at 181.  
21
 Id.  
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the “specific kinds of drugs at issue may matter here as elsewhere. Different kinds of 
antipsychotic drugs may produce different side effects and enjoy different levels of success.”22 
B. Prohibition Against Executing the Mentally Incompetent 
In 1974, Alvin Bernard Ford was convicted of murder and was later given the death 
sentence with no signs of mental illness or incompetency at the time of his trial or sentence.
23
 
Ford’s behavior began to gradually change in 1982 beginning with an obsession with the Ku 
Klux Klan which eventually led to many more severe delusions ranging from a belief that prison 
guards were keeping bodies in certain concrete enclosures used as beds to the notion that Ford’s 
family was being held hostage within the prison and that Ford himself was the only person that 
could rescue them.
24
 Ford’s counsel realized that the client’s competency was clearly at issue and 
eventually the Governor of Florida appointed a panel of psychiatrists to determine if he 
understood why the death penalty was being enforced against him, and even after determinations 
acknowledging Ford’s psychosis, the Governor signed a death warrant to execute Ford.25 
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it narrowed the issue in the case as to whether 
the Constitution and the Eighth Amendment created a substantive restriction on the power of the 
State to administer the death penalty to an insane prisoner.
26
 The Supreme Court concluded that 
the Eighth Amendment, which bans cruel and unusual punishment,
27
 prohibits a “State from 
carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”28 The Court further explained 
                                                        
22
 Id.  
23
 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986) 
24
 Id. at 402.  
25
 Id. at 402-04 (discussing that two of Ford’s psychiatrists that were not included on the Governor’s panel 
believed that he was suffering from a major mental disorder resembling Paranoid Schizophrenia and that he had “no 
understanding of why he was being executed, made no connection between the homicide of which he had been 
convicted and the death penalty, and indeed sincerely believed that he would not be executed because he owned the 
prisons and could control the Governor through mind waves”).  
26
 Id. at 405.  
27
 U.S. Const. amend. VIII.  
28
 Ford v. Wainwright at 409-10.  
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that as society has continued to evolve so has the interpretation and protection afforded under the 
Eighth Amendment, and that Amendment was not meant only to outlaw condemned practices of 
the 18
th
 century, but that the “Court takes into account objective evidence of contemporary 
values before determining whether a particular punishment comports with the fundamental 
human dignity that the Amendment protects.”29  
Justice Powell concurred that execution of the insane is in and of itself cruel and unusual 
and that the Eighth Amendment contains an “evolving standard of decency.”30 Justice Powell 
further recognized that an issue existed regarding what standard should be adopted by courts in 
determining the meaning of insanity in the Eight Amendment context. The competency 
determination articulated by Justice Powell held that the Eighth Amendment forbids executing 
those persons who are unaware of the punishment they will suffer and why they are suffering the 
punishment, further indicating that this standard defines the type of “mental deficiency that 
should trigger the Eighth Amendment prohibition.”31 Furthermore, Justice Powell explained 
“only if the defendant is aware that his death is approaching can he prepare himself for 
passing.”32 
The Supreme Court faced a similar issue of whether the Eighth Amendment permitted the 
execution of a prisoner who lacks the mental capacity to understand, that as a punishment for a 
crime he is being executed because of his mental illness in 2007 in Panetti v. Quarterman, and it 
also clarified its holding in Ford v. Wainwright.
33
 In 1992 Scott Louis Panetti broke into his 
estranged wife’s parents home, where he then proceeded to shoot and kill his wife’s father and 
                                                        
29
 Id. at 405-10 (listing a number of historical and current justifications of why a State should not execute an 
insane prisoner including that it simply is offensive to humanity and because it does not have any deterrence value 
nor a retributive purpose) 
30
 Id. at 418-19 (Powell, J., concurring) 
31
 Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining that Ford’s plea of insanity clearly falls within this standard).  
32
 Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring) 
33
 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954 (2007).  
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mother and took his wife and daughter as hostages, before he eventually surrendered to the 
police a short time later.
34
 Panetti then chose to represent himself as a pro se litigant in his trial 
for capital murder and the court ordered a psychiatric evaluation which revealed not only that 
Panetti suffered from serious delusions and hallucinations, but also that he had previously been 
hospitalized for these mental disorders on a number of occasions.
35
 Irrespective of the “bizarre”, 
“scary”, and “trance-like” behavior Panetti displayed during his trial and clear indications that he 
was suffering from mental illness affecting his competency, the jury found Panetti guilty of 
committing capital murder, thus authorizing his death sentence.
36
 
After numerous procedural actions taken by Panetti, the Supreme Court finally 
considered his second habeas corpus application.
37
 The Supreme Court held that the standard 
applied by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine Panetti’s competency incorrectly 
foreclosed Panetti from providing evidence that would show that his mental illness obstructed 
him from obtaining a rational understanding of why and for what reason the State was executing 
him.
38
 The Court further explained that the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to consider evidence of 
Panetti’s psychological dysfunction was to mistake the holding and logic of Ford.39 Finally the 
Court held that “therefore [it is] error to derive from Ford, and the substantive standard for 
incompetency its opinions broadly identify, a strict test for competency that treats delusional 
                                                        
34
 Id. at 935-36 
35
 Id. (citing that his wife had explained one of his severe delusions where he believed the devil had possessed 
their house and in an attempt to cleanse the house Panetti buried a number of valuable items in the nearby ground) 
36
 Id. at 936-37. 
37
 Id. at 941-47. 
38
 Id. at 956-60 
39
 Id. at 960 (“Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between 
a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper 
purpose”).  
  9 
beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware the State has identified the link between his crime 
and the punishment to be inflicted.”40 
C. Split Decisions Regarding the Forcible Medication of Mentally Incompetent Prisoners in 
Order to Restore Their Competency for Execution 
While significant progress has been made in mental health jurisprudence, the lack of a 
decision by the Supreme Court on the specific issue of whether the State can forcibly medicate a 
death row inmate to make them competent for execution has resulted in criticism and confusion 
for courts that are faced with the issue.
41
 In October of 2003, the Supreme Court chose to decline 
to hear the case of Charles Singleton who eventually was executed in 2004 while he still suffered 
from his mental illness.
42
 The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals faced this issue in the controversial 
case of Singleton v. Norris where it held that a State did not “violate the Eighth Amendment as 
interpreted by Ford when it executes a prisoner who became incompetent during his long stay on 
death row but who subsequently regained competency through appropriate medical care.”43  
The State of Arkansas convicted Singleton in 1979 of the capital felony murder of Mary 
Lou York, but his mental state did not begin to deteriorate until 1987 when he began to believe 
that his prison cell was possessed by demons and that there was demon blood in the cell.
44
 
Singleton was then forcibly medicated a number of times from 1997 until the time of his 
eventual execution because of his severe psychotic symptoms that he displayed, and his 
medication was even increased more than once when he would begin to show symptoms of his 
                                                        
40
 Id. 
41
 American Civil Liberties Union, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty (May 5, 2009) 
http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/mental-illness-and-death-penalty.  
42
 Kevin Drew, Executed Mentally Ill Inmate Heard Voices Until End, CNN (Jan. 6, 2004), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2004-01-06/justice/singleton.death.row_1_charles-singleton-singleton-case-mentally-ill-
inmate?_s=PM:LAW.  
43
 Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003).  
44
 Id. at 1030-32 
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psychosis.
45
 One of Singleton’s strongest arguments against the forcible medication by the State 
was the contention that the medication was not in his “best medical interest” since one of the 
main effects of the medication would be to render the patient competent, which would result in 
his execution.
46
 Alternatively, Singleton presented the court with a different solution in support 
of which he argued that instead of a prisoner choosing from a choice between forced medication 
that is subsequently followed with his execution or with the choice of not receiving any 
treatment at all and thus continuing to suffer from his mental illness and his imprisonment, there 
should be a “stay of execution until involuntary medication is no longer needed to maintain his 
competence.”47  Singleton also conceded that if the medication was given during a stay of 
execution that it would be in his medical interest, but the court rejected his argument, not 
granting a stay of execution and reasoned that, “the best medical interests of the prisoner must be 
determined without regard to whether there is a pending date of execution.”48 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in State v. Perry took the exact opposite view on this 
issue when it granted a stay of a forcible medication order against a mentally incompetent 
prisoner and held the attempt by the State to circumvent the prohibition against the execution of 
the insane by “forcibly medicating an insane prisoner with antipsychotic drugs violates his rights 
under our state constitution.”49 The Perry court distinguished this case from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Washington v. Harper for the following three reasons: (1) the forced medication of a 
mentally ill prisoner in order to facilitate his execution is not medical treatment, but is 
antithetical to the “basic principles of the healing arts”; (2) in this case the state has not 
addressed the safety of its prison and other inmates as its reason for the forcible medication, but 
                                                        
45
 Id.  
46
 Id. at 1026.  
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. at 1026  
49
 State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747 (La. 1992).  
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instead is seeking to forcibly medicate the prisoner as an “instrument of his execution”; and (3) 
the Harper decision clearly implies that forced medication of prisoners with antipsychotic drugs 
may “not be used by the state for the purpose of punishment.”50 The court then concluded that 
application of the death penalty applied to a mentally incompetent prisoner by forcibly 
medicating him to restore competency is: 
[C]ruel because it imposes significantly more indignity, pain and suffering than 
ordinarily is necessary for the mere extinguishment of life, excessive because it 
imposes a severe penalty without furthering any of the valid social goals of 
punishment, and unusual because it subjects to the death penalty a class of 
offenders that has been exempt therefrom for centuries and adds novel burdens to 
the punishment of the insane which will not be suffered by sane capital 
offenders.
51
  
 
II.  ARGUMENTS AND JUSTIFICATIONS AGAINST FORCIBLE MEDICATION REGIMES 
 The arguments and justifications against states adopting forcible medication regimes to 
execute mentally incompetent prisoners can be organized into the following categories: (1) best 
medical interest; (2) artificial competency; (3) the goals of criminal law; and (4) dignity.  
A. Best Medical Interest 
The best medical interest argument stands for the proposition that when a mentally 
incompetent prisoner with a definite date of execution is forcibly medicated by the State, the 
forced medication of antipsychotic drugs is not in the prisoner’s best medical interest, because if 
the medication is effective in rendering the prisoner competent it will result in the prisoner’s 
execution.
52
 The reasoning in support of this argument is that (1) forcible medication regimes are 
                                                        
50
 Id. at 751-52 (emphasis added).  
51
 Id. at 761.  
52
 Lisa N. Jones, Singleton v. Norris: The Eight Circuit Maneuvered Around the Constitution by Forcibly 
Medicating Insane Prisoners to Create an Artificial Competence for Purposes of Execution 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
431, 437 (2004).  
The best medical interest argument relates back to Washington v. Harper where the Court held that, “the Due 
Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs 
against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” 
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contrary to a medical professional’s ethical standards; and (2) the use of a forcible medication 
regime as a method for the state to inflict a capital sentence results in a detrimental psychological 
effect to the prisoner.
53
  
Ethical standards for medical professionals begin with the Hippocratic Oath, which is “a 
primary source of medical ethics which defines the role of healer, requiring respect for the 
patient and imposing a duty to do no harm and take no life.”54 Moreover, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) expressly prohibits a physician from participating in legal executions and 
also states that, “[w]hen a condemned prisoner has been declared incompetent to be executed, 
physicians should not treat the prisoner for the purpose of restoring competence unless a 
commutation order is issued before treatment begins.”55 While states may exempt a physician 
from legal liability for his or her participation in the states forcible medication regime, this does 
not vindicate the physician from a professional ethical violation.
56
 When a psychiatrist forcibly 
medicates a mentally incompetent prisoner to restore his competency to further the states interest 
in execution, not only is he in violation of his professional ethical standards, but he has also 
compromised his patient’s welfare and best medical interest in favor of the interest of the state.57 
Additionally, when a physician participates in a forcible medication regime, the public 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990); Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Central to Singleton’s 
argument is his contention that medication ‘obviously is not in the prisoner’s ultimate best medical interest’ where 
one effect of the medication is rendering the patient competent”); American Civil Liberties Union, Mental Illness 
and the Death Penalty (May 5, 2009) http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/mental-illness-and-death-penalty 
(criticizing the Singleton court because the Eighth Circuit “refused to consider the fact that the medication would 
permit his execution in the calculation when deciding whether the medication was ‘appropriate medical care’”).  
53
 Michaela P. Sewall, Pushing Execution Over the Constitutional Line: Forcible Medication of Condemned 
Inmates and the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments 51 B.C. L. REV. 1279, 1310 (2010), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol51/iss4/7. 
54
 Rochelle Graff Salguero, Medical Ethics and Competency to be Executed 96 YALE L.J. 167, 173 (1986).  
55
 American Medical Association, Opinion 2.06 – Capital Punishment (Jun. 2000) http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion206.page#. 
56
 See Salguero, supra note 54, at 178.  
57
 Kursten B. Hensl, Restored to Health to be Put to Death: Reconciling the Legal and Ethical Dilemmas of 
Medicating to Execute in Singleton v. Norris, 49 VILL. L. REV. 291, 325 (2004) (noting that “this practice jeopardizes 
the fiduciary nature of the traditional physician-patient relationship”); See Salguero, supra note 54, at 178 (“Each 
treatment strategy to heal the inmate is in fact another strategy to ensure his death”).  
  13 
perception of a medical professional as a person who provides care and as a healer can shift to 
person who actually is causing harm, thus undermining the “overall integrity of the medical 
profession.”58  Surely if a forced medication regime is contrary to the ethical standards of the 
medical profession in the aggregate, it cannot be in the prisoner’s best medical interest, can it?59 
Therefore, since consensus among medical practitioners is that “forcible medication regimens are 
no longer medically appropriate once an execution date has been set, the legal community is 
obligated to defer to this professional judgment.”60 
Another justification supporting the best medical interest argument is that forcible 
medication regimes lead to a distortion of the mentally ill prisoners experience of his treatment, 
and that the “distortions transform medication from a source of healing into a source of 
punishment that inflicts acute psychological distress and suffering.”61 This distortion is furthered 
by the idea that mentally ill prisoner is not treated with the proper trust and care he would most 
likely receive in an ordinary physician-patient relationship since the physician here is acting to 
further the capital punishment interest of the state.
62
 Thus, the forcible medication regime is 
actually causing a type of detrimental psychological effect, and is not in the prisoner’s best 
medical interest.
63
  
                                                        
58
 See Hensl, supra note 57, at 326. 
59
 See id at 324.  
60
 See Sewall, supra note 53, at 1311-12.  
Constitutional doctrine relevant to the issue of forcibly medicating condemned inmates to 
restore competence, including the Eighth Amendment prohibition against execution of 
the insane and the due process requirement that a forcible medication regimen be 
medically appropriate, has made it impossible for states to accomplish execution of 
incompetent death row inmates without direct participation from physicians, the only 
experts capable of assessing, diagnosing, and treating the psychosis of these inmates. 
Id. Since states require a medical professional’s participation in a forcible medication regime, they should adopt 
a punitive scheme that does not conflict with the medical professional’s ethical standards.   
61
 See Sewall, supra note 53 at 1317 (“A condemned inmate is not only forced to submit body and mind to 
powerful and invasive medications, but is also forced into an inequitable situation where any positive response to 
medication will have the perverse effect of contributing to his ultimate doom”).  
62
 Id. at 1318.  
63
 Id. 
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B. Artificial Competency 
The method most favored by state legislatures in restoring the competency of a mentally 
incompetent prisoner is the use of antipsychotic drugs.
64
 However, commentators argue against 
the practice of forcibly medicating prisoners with a sentence of capital punishment based “on the 
understanding that antipsychotic drugs are capable of calming and repressing symptoms of 
psychosis, but not of curing the underlying mental illness.”65 Another deficiency in antipsychotic 
medication is that not only is the relief the medication provides temporary, but the effectiveness 
of the medication is not easily predictable causing a reliability problem, which leads to the term 
“artificial competency”.66 If the prisoner were to stop taking the medication, his mental illness 
and its symptoms that made him incompetent in the first place will return.
67
 
The reason this practice becomes problematic is in light of the standard articulated by 
Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Ford v. Wainwright that at the moment of his 
execution the prisoner must be aware of his punishment and why he is to suffer that punishment, 
                                                        
64
 See Hensl, supra note 57, at 303.  
65
 Sewall, supra note 53, at 1304; Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The Illusion of Sanity: The Constitutional and Moral 
Danger of Medicating Condemned Prisoners in Order to Execute Them, 76 TENN. L. REV. 641, 649  (2009) (“More 
important, antipsychotic medication does not cure the underlying mental illness”); see Hensl, supra note 57, at 304; 
Michelle K. Bachand, Antipsychotic Drugs and the Incompetent Defendant: A Perspective on the Treatment and 
Prosecution of Incompetent Defendants, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1059, 1061 (1990) (“Additionally, health 
practitioners agree that antipsychotic drugs do not cure mental illness, but instead provide only temporary relief”).  
     The dissent in Singleton v. Norris explained that these drugs are not providing a cure for the mentally 
incompetent prisoner, but are merely masking their psychotic symptoms, which will return when the medication is 
removed. 319 F.3d 1018, 1033-34 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
66
  See Keith Alan Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic Drugs, 47 ARK. L. REV. 361, 
377  (1994) (explaining that it is difficult to determine if a prisoner is free of his mental illness at the precise moment 
of his execution when antipsychotic medication is being used to restore competence); see Bachand, supra note 52, at 
1061 (“The majority of health practitioners maintain that predicting whether antipsychotic drugs will be effective for 
any given patient is impossible”); Entzeroth, supra note 52, at 649 (“Rather, the medication ameliorates the 
symptoms providing the afflicted individual  relief from the delusions, hallucinations, and psychosis that plague him 
or her”).  
 One of the most controversial problems that exists with the use of antipsychotic drugs is that when the 
resulting artificial drug-induced sanity is assumed to be true sanity is that the artificial sanity is “temporary and 
unpredictable: ‘the effect of psychoactive drugs on a particular recipient is uncertain; the drugs may affect the same 
individual differently each time they are administered.’” Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1034 (Heaney, J., 
dissenting). 
67
 Entzeroth, supra note 52, at 649 (“If the patient discontinues the medication, the individual’s symptoms 
return”).  
  15 
for the punishment to not violate the Eighth Amendment.
68
 Therefore, a mentally incompetent 
prisoner whose symptoms are being treated by forcible medication with antipsychotic drugs will 
not satisfy the Ford standard previously mentioned because his symptoms are only being 
repressed, but his disease is not being cured, thus he will still be insane at the time of his 
execution.
69
  
C. The Goals of Criminal Law 
The consensus among a majority of criminal law commentators is that there are the 
following possible purposes behind the concept of criminal punishment: “retribution, general 
deterrence, specific deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”70 In the capital punishment 
context, the two goals of criminal punishment that are promoted and justified are the goals of 
retribution and deterrence.
71
 The theory of retribution is that when a person makes a choice that 
offends the moral views of society, that person then deserves blame and punishment for that 
particular choice, and thus he must payback a societal debt, which was caused by his morally 
                                                        
68
 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986); see Hensl, supra note 57, at 304-5 (“This distinction is 
particularly important in light of Justice Powell’s assertion in Ford that an inmate must be ‘cured of his disease’ to 
be executed”);  
69 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment does not allow the 
state to execute an insane prisoner); see Sewall, supra note 53, at 1304 (“Considering such ‘artificial’ or ‘synthetic’ 
competence to fall below the standard articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Ford v. Wainwright 
and its 2007 decision in Panetti v. Quarterman, these scholars view execution of the forcibly medicated as 
intrinsically cruel and unusual, and argue that if there has once been a determination of incompetence, then there 
should be a permanent stay of execution”).  
    This artificial sanity becomes even more troubling when a court is trying to determine if the prisoner has met 
the Ford test for competency at the precise moment of his execution. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1034 
(Heaney, J., dissenting).  
70
 Christopher Slobogin, Arti Rai & Ralph Reisner, Law and The Mental Health System: Civil and Criminal 
Aspects 540 (5th ed. 2009). 
71
 Olga Vlasova, Towards Exempting the Severely Mentally Ill from the Death Penalty, JURIST - Dateline, (Apr. 
30, 2012), http://jurist.org/dateline/2012/04/olga-vlasova-death-penalty.php (“Imposing the death penalty on the 
severely mentally ill is unnecessary and amounts to wanton infliction of pain, as it does not serve the principal social 
purposes of capital punishment: deterrence and retribution”); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 766 (La. 1992) (noting 
that a sentence of capital punishment can really promote only two of the social goals of criminal punishment, which 
would be the retribution and deterrence against capital crimes); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (“The 
death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by 
prospective offenders”).  
  16 
offensive conduct.
72
 Alternatively, deterrence theory stems from the idea that punishment can be 
used as a means to discourage future criminals from conduct that is detrimental to society as a 
whole, regardless of the criminal’s culpability or guilt.73  
A forcible medication regime for mentally incompetent prisoners on death row does not 
satisfy the theory of deterrence, nor does it satisfy the retribution theory for the following two 
reasons. One reason is that deterrence theory is ineffective when it is applied to the execution of 
an insane prisoner because “the insane are not representative of society at large. They are a 
special class considered to be incompetent and therefore not responsible for their own actions.”74 
This ineffective deterrence concept applies equally to mentally incompetent prisoners since 
studies have shown that approximately five to ten percent of prisoners on death row suffer from a 
serious mental illness,
75
 and therefore this small amount of prisoners do not represent society in 
the aggregate.  
The second reason is that since the theory of retribution is based on the culpability and 
blameworthiness of the offender for his morally reprehensible conduct, a prisoner that is insane 
will not be able to appreciate and understand the substantial significance of his capital 
punishment sentence.
76
 Furthermore, the insane prisoner does not possess the ability to 
understand the reasoning behind his punishment, therefore stripping the retributory effect of the 
punishment.
77
 This reasoning is applicable to mentally incompetent prisoners who are forcibly 
medicated based on the previous argument regarding artificial competency, because if the 
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antipsychotic drugs only provide relief of symptoms and do not cure the underlying mental 
illness, then the prisoner is still insane at the time of his execution and is therefore not able to 
understand the significance and reasoning behind his punishment.
78
 Thus, for the following 
reasons mentioned above, forcible medication regimes created to execute mentally incompetent 
prisoners are contrary to the goals of criminal law. 
D. Dignity 
The final argument against the states use of forcible medication regimes to execute 
mentally incompetent prisoners is that it is “offensive to the ‘dignity of man, which is the basic 
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.’”79 This dignity is essential to the Eighth 
Amendment and its “evolving standards of decency”80 and the “core value of protecting human 
dignity requires that a punishment not result in ‘gratuitous infliction of suffering.’”81 
Furthermore, the cruelty that exists with the execution of a mentally incompetent prisoner is that 
unlike a sane prisoner, the insane prisoner is unable to properly prepare in a spiritual and mental 
way for his death.
82
 Additionally, since the mentally incompetent prisoner is not as adequately 
prepared for his death as the sane prisoner, he could potentially face an additional amount of 
suffering “because the condemned was taken through an unknown and frightening process that 
would culminate in his own death.”83 More specifically, when a state forcibly medicates 
mentally incompetent prisoners for execution purposes, the state is forcing the prisoner to take 
unwanted antipsychotic medication irrespective of any harmful side effects in order to render the 
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prisoner competent for execution.
 84
 This action by the State could represent a “gratuitous 
infliction of suffering” when compared to the execution of a sane person and thus would be 
offensive to notions of human dignity under the Eighth Amendment.
85
  Finally, the rationale 
offered by Professor Richard J. Bonnie supporting the prohibition against executing a mentally 
incompetent prisoner is based solely on this theory of dignity: 
If this prohibition has any continuing justification in the contemporary context, I 
believe it must be found in respect for the dignity of the condemned. The prisoner 
has a right, even under imminent sentence of death, to be treated as a person, 
worthy of respect, not as an object of the State’s effort to carry out its promises. 
As Justice Powell suggested, a person under the shadow of death should have the 
opportunity to make the few choices that remain available to him. He should have 
the opportunity to decide who should be present at his execution, what he will eat 
for his last meal, what, if anything, he will utter for his last words, and whether he 
will repent or go defiantly to his grave. A prisoner who does not understand the 
nature and purpose of the execution is not able to exercise the choices that remain 
to him. To execute him in this condition is an affront to his dignity as a person 
and to the “dignity of man,” the core value of the Eighth Amendment.86 
 
III.  POTENTIAL PROCEDURAL SOLUTIONS 
 There are two potential procedural solutions, which address and try to resolve at least 
some of the issues associated with forcible medication regimes. The first solution is based off of 
a statute enacted by the State of Maryland and will be referred to as the “Maryland Solution.” 
The second solution is based on the recommendation that psychiatrists should have a larger role 
in working with the State regarding competency issues related to capital punishment.  
A. The Maryland Solution 
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The State of Maryland, under the Annotated Code of Maryland Correctional Services §3-
904 (hereinafter “Maryland Law”) has promulgated a statute, which specifically addresses death 
penalty procedures for an incompetent inmate.
87
 First, §3-904(c) of this statute has codified the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the execution of an inmate “who has become 
incompetent.”88  The term “inmate” is further defined under the statute to mean “an individual 
who has been convicted of murder and sentenced to death.”89 Pursuant to §3-904(a)(2) the 
Maryland Law also defines the term “incompetent” to mean “the state of mind an inmate who, as 
a result of mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks awareness of the fact of the inmate’s 
impending execution; and that the inmate is to be executed for the crime of murder.”90 Finally, 
§3-904(h)(1)-(2) of this statute is the most significant and it requires that upon finding an inmate 
to be incompetent, “the court shall stay any warrant of execution that was previously issued and 
has not yet expired and remand the case to the court in which the sentence of death was imposed. 
The court in which the sentence of death was imposed shall strike the sentence of death and enter 
in its place a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.”91 Furthermore, the 
American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, National Alliance on 
Mental Illness, and the American Bar Association have all adopted identical versions of a 
recommendation that is similar to the Maryland Solution, and it recommends that when a 
prisoner is found to be suffering from a mental disability or disorder, and is unable to understand 
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the purpose behind the punishment or unable to appreciate why the punishment is being imposed 
upon him, the death sentence should be replaced with a less severe form of punishment.
92
  
The most significant benefit of adopting the Maryland Solution when states use forcible 
medication regimes are that it allows medical practitioners to practice their profession ethically 
without focusing on any extraneous circumstances. First, under this solution a medical 
professional would not be put into the uncomfortable position of forcibly medicating a mentally 
incompetent prisoner with the knowledge that if his treatment were effective in restoring 
competency, then the prisoner would most likely be executed. The Maryland Solution, which 
parallels the American Medical Association’s ethical code regarding capital punishment,93 will 
therefore allow a medical practitioner to focus his treatment toward what is truly in the prisoner’s 
best medical interest. By limiting these ethical controversies, the Maryland Solution would allow 
a psychiatrist to increase and decrease the use of anti-psychotic drugs depending only on what 
would be best for the treatment of his patient, instead of fearing that his treatment would lead to 
a professional ethical violation.  
Another benefit is that this solution could potentially limit issues that arise from 
“artificial competency.” Since the Maryland Solution would strike a capital punishment sentence 
on a finding a death row inmate incompetent and replace it with life imprisonment,
94
 the concern 
that antipsychotic medication does not cure mental illness would be lessened here.
95
 This would 
be because death row prisoner’s who are deemed incompetent under the Maryland Solution 
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would not be facing a capital punishment sentence
96
 and therefore there would not be an issue of 
determining competency at the exact moment when an execution occurs. Therefore, the 
Maryland Solution provides a more effective and more ethical alternative when compared with 
forcible medication regimes.  
B. An Increased Role for Psychiatrists 
While there is significant variation between different states with regards to how much 
involvement a psychiatrist or physician would have in relation to its laws regarding capital 
punishment,
97
 I would propose creating an express statutory role for psychiatrists in all capital 
punishment cases. For instance, a Nevada statute allows the Director of the Department of 
Corrections to determine that “[i]f, after judgment of death, there is a good reason to believe that 
the defendant has become insane”, the defendant could be entitled to a hearing before either two 
psychologists or two psychiatrists.
98
 Additionally, psychiatrists can provide a benefit to the State 
because “mental health experts can provide testimony that can meaningfully inform judicial 
decisions about competency to be executed with established procedures that have a record of 
producing reliable, consistent results.”99 
I would further propose that there should be an express statutory provision requiring a 
baseline competency hearing for all capital punishment cases. This express statutory provision 
would be most effective when coupled with the Maryland Solution presented above. The reason 
behind coupling the two together is that even in cases where there is ineffective assistance of 
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counsel regarding a client’s competency, these mandatory competency hearings will bring to 
light whether a prisoner is mentally incompetent. The specific timing of these mandatory 
hearings would be immediately after the conviction stage and before the sentencing stage. By 
creating this procedural mechanism, states will have a high probability of determining whether 
an individual is incompetent and is therefore not a candidate for the death penalty before the 
prisoner is sentenced with capital punishment. Another benefit of this baseline competency 
hearing is that it establishes a starting point for courts to look back at when a competency 
challenge is brought up in the future. The courts will at least have a baseline level of the 
prisoner’s mental health, which would help the court in the future to determine whether a 
prisoner’s mental health has truly deteriorated and he is now incompetent, or if the prisoner is 
attempting to falsely misuse the system to lessen his or her punishment.  
IV.  STATES LIMITATION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
 While the Maryland Solution and the statutorily authorized role of psychiatrists in capital 
punishment cases address some potential solutions against forcible medication regimes, more 
universal problems still persist. The biggest of which, as I argue, is the recent mitigation of the 
insanity defense by states. Also for clarification purposes, this section regarding the states recent 
trend to limit the insanity defense only applies to the class of offenders who were suffering from 
a mental illness when they committed their crime, and does not apply to those offenders who 
became insane awaiting their execution.  
A. The Last Forty Years 
The changes the State of Arizona has made to its insanity defense will provide an 
appropriate example to understand the overall trend by states recently to weaken the insanity 
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defense.
100
 Arizona enacted its first insanity defense statute in 1977 under which it codified the 
M’Naughten test, which stated: 
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct the 
person was suffering from such a mental disease or defect as not to know the 
nature and quality of the act or, if such person did know, that such person did not 
know that what he was doing was wrong.
101
 
 
The Arizona legislature then proceeded to amend the insanity statute in 1983 to raise and shift 
the burden of proof to the insane defendant to prove that he or she is insane by “clear and 
convincing evidence” and that burden of proof is still just as steep today.102 The most current 
version of the inanity statute in Arizona functions under a “guilty except insane verdict” and the 
current insanity test is that “[a] person may be found guilty except insane if at the time of the 
commission of the criminal act the person was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such 
severity that the person did not know the criminal act was wrong.”103 The key difference between 
the 1977 insanity test and this test above is the removal of the cognitive prong which gave a 
defense to a person who did not know the nature or quality of his or her actions because of a 
mental illness.
104
  
 The reasoning behind this trend by states in mitigating the effectiveness of the insanity 
defense can primarily be explained by a societal shift during the 1980’s where a great amount of 
emphasis was put on keeping the community safe, even if it came at the cost of the mentally 
ill.
105
 In 1982 after John W. Hinckley Jr. trial succeeded in his affirmative defense after his failed 
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attempt at assassinating President Ronald Reagan, “[t]he popularity among the public of the 
insanity defense dramatically decreased.”106 After the Hinckley acquittal, both states and the 
federal government were motivated in weakening the insanity defense based on this public 
outcry.
107
  
However, states rely too heavily on the public perception of the insanity defense, which is 
normally shaped by “the media, and the portrayal is not always accurate.”108 Recent research 
further indicates that the affirmative defense of insanity is not a very successful defense, as the 
public might believe, and that “only one percent of felony defendants nationwide raise the 
insanity defense.”109 Finally, theories that defendants are able to abuse the insanity defense by 
pretending to have a mental illness are misguided and do not have empirical support.
110
 
B. How the Insanity Defense Affects Forcible Medication 
The connection between the insanity defense and forcible medication regimes can be 
explained by the idea that the insanity defense serves as a gatekeeper. The insanity defense 
provides a gatekeeper function because it at least limits the class of offenders who were insane 
during the trial and conviction proceedings, and limits the total amount of offenders who can be 
capitally punished. However, since the states in recent years have limited the insanity defense, 
more and more offenders that might have been limited by the insanity defense, now are 
sentenced and put in prison facing sentences of capital punishment. Therefore, since the insanity 
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defense has been so significantly limited, states have come up with the alternative that they 
believe is best in light of the increase of prisoners with competency issues, thus resulting in the 
unjustified forcible medication regimes to execute mentally incompetent prisoners. 
C. A Case Study: Clark v. Arizona 
An appropriate example that demonstrates the recent trend of the weakening of the 
insanity defense is in Clark v. Arizona. During the early hours of June 21, 2000, Eric Clark who 
was seventeen at the time shot and killed Jeffrey Moritz, who was a police officer of the 
Flagstaff Police.
111
 Officer Moritz was responding to complaints there was someone in a pick-up 
truck blaring loud music in a residential area.
112
 After he pulled Clark over, Clark shot Officer 
Moritz and then fled the scene of the crime on foot, but was eventually arrested the next day.
113
 
During his trial Clark provided significant evidence that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia 
when the incident occurred, and also provided evidence from friends, family, and even a 
psychiatrist with regards to his bizarre behavior during the time period before he killed Officer 
Moritz.
114
 The trial judge then found Clark guilty of killing Officer Moritz, found that he was not 
insane at the time of his crime, and then sentenced him to life imprisonment with no possibility 
of parole.
115
 Furthermore, Clark’s appeal to the Supreme Court was unsuccessful as the Court 
affirmed the lower court.
116
 
The real issue now becomes what would happen if Clark had been given a sentence of 
capital punishment instead of life imprisonment? Would the State try to forcibly medicate him if 
he argued that he was incompetent? Hypothetically, if Clark were under the sentence of capital 
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punishment, he would clearly be someone who was failed by the insanity defense and will now 
be the target of a states forcible medication regime. Even with all of the evidence that he was 
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia was not enough for him to be found insane under the 
current Arizona defense. Clark v. Arizona demonstrates how the weakening of the insanity 
defense will unfortunately lead someone like Clark to suffer both the hardships of imprisonment 
along with the hardships of possibly being forcibly medicated by the State. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While states have tried to use forcible medication regimes to restore a mentally 
incompetent prisoner’s competency to execute mentally incompetent prisoners, this practice is 
unjustified and should be halted by states. There are potential procedural solutions that states can 
adopt here that would be more effective and ethical resulting in a better outcome for both the 
State and the mentally incompetent prisoners. Finally, as states continue to restrict the use of the 
insanity defense, they will continue to be faced with competency issues at later points of an 
imprisonment of a prisoner. For the following reasons states should stop the use of forcible 
medication regimes, and bring back more bite into the insanity defense.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
